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THE CORPORATION AS MEDIATING
INSTITUTION: AN EFFICACIOUS SYNTHESIS OF
STAKEHOLDER THEORY AND CORPORATE
CONSTITUENCY STATUTES*
Timothy L. Fort**
I. INTRODUCTION
A. The Stakeholder/Constituency Debate
No approach has been more prominent in contemporary busi-
ness ethics than stakeholder theory. Led by the work of Edward Free-
man, the theory has successfully played off the typical focus on
corporate duties to "shareholders" to identify duties toward employ-
ees, suppliers, local communities, and perhaps many others besides.'
More than half the states have enacted statutory forms of stakeholder
theory known as "corporate constituency statutes."2 These statutes,
* Copyright 1997 by Timothy L. Fort. All Rights Reserved. An earlier, but sub-
stantially similar, version of this paper was named "Outstanding Proceedings Paper" at
the Annual Meeting of the Academy for Legal Studies in Business held in Quebec
City, August, 1996.
** Assistant Professor, University of Michigan. Ph.D., J.D. Northwestern
University;, MA, B.A. University of Notre Dame. My thanks to Nancy Nerad for her
assistance in preparing this paper.
1 William M. Evan & R. Edward Freeman, A Stakeholder Theoy of the Modern Corpo-
ration: Kantian Capitalism, in ETHICAL THEORY & BusINEss 97, 101-105 (Tom L.
Beauchamp & Norman E. Bowie eds., 3d ed. 1988). The authors specifically leave
open the notion that the potential list of stakeholders could be quite broad.
2 See AIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-2702 (West 1996); FiA. STAT. ANN. § 607.0830
(West 1993); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-830 (1994); HAW. REV. STAT. § 415-35(b) (1993);
IDAHO CODE § 30-1702 (1996); 805 ILL. Come. STAT. ANN. 5/8.85 (West 1993); IND.
CODE ANN. § 23-1-35-1 (Michie 1995); IOWA CODE ANN. § 491.101B (West 1991); Ky.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 271B12-210(4) (Banks-Baldwin 1996); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 12:92(G) (West 1994); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 716 (West 1996); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 156B, § 65 (West 1996); MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.251(5) (West Supp.
1993); Miss. CODE ANN. § 79-4-8.30(d) (1996); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.347 (West 1991);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2035(1) (c) (1991); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A6.1 (West Supp. 1997);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-11-35(D) (Michie 1997); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 717(b) (McKin-
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like stakeholder theory itself, are open-ended in two ways. First, they
generally allow, but do not require, managers to take into account
nonshareholder constituents in making corporate decisions. Second,
it is unclear exactly what weight managers ought to give to the inter-
ests of various nonshareholders in the corporation.3
In addition to these philosophical ambiguities, the debate sur-
rounding "corporate constituency statutes" has shed more heat than
light on who is entitled to what:
It is surprising that in light of the significant amount of literature on
constituency statutes, commentators have offered few specific an-
swers to these questions [of how statutes should be interpreted and
what principles ought to be used]. Instead, corresponding to the
rhetorical temperature of the discussion, interpretations of the stat-
utes have tended toward extremes. 4
B. Business as Mediating Institution: A First Look
In this Article, I wish to suggest that criticisms of stakeholder the-
ory do not fatally wound it when the corporation is viewed as a mediat-
ing institution.5 As a mediating institution, duties primarily flow to
the internal members of the corporation. When corporate responsi-
bilities are arranged so there is a mandatory requirement for manage-
ment to be accountable to internal members of the corporation, such
as shareholders and employees, but not legally accountable to exter-
nal constituents, such as suppliers, the environment, and the host
community, the corporation can do what it does best. Primarily, cor-
porations should owe duties to internal constituents. Duties to exter-
nal constituents are important, and specific legislation will be
necessary to prevent corporate abuse of, for instance, the environ-
ment. Management may also find that "good business" dictates "good
ethics" in how customers, suppliers, and host communities are
treated. But as a matter of corporate governance, businesses ought to
be mediating institutions.
ney Supp. 1997); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.59(E) (Anderson 1992); OR. REV.
STAT. § 60.357 (Supp. 1996); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 1715-1716 (1995); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 7-5.2-8 (1992); S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 47-33-4 (Michie 1991); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-
103-204 (1995); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.0827 (West 1992); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 17-16-
830(e) (Michie 1997).
3 See Timothy L. Fort, Corporate Constituency Statutes: A Dialectical Interpretation, 15
J.L. & CoM. 257 (1995).
4 Eric W. Orts, Beyond Shareholders: Interpreting Corporate Constituency Statutes, 61
GEo. WASH. L. REV. 14, 71 (1992).
5 For the remainder of this paper, I use "stakeholder theory" and "corporate
constituency statutes" interchangeably.
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What is a mediating institution? According to a recent article,
mediating institutions are communities which socialize their mem-
bers. 6 "Mediating" between the individual and society as a whole, they
provide a community. They require individuals to grasp their respon-
sibilities to others, at least within their group, so that a person's very
identity is developed.7 Mediating institutions teach individuals that
they are not autonomous beings accountable only to their own wants
and desires. Instead, a series of relationships comprise personhood
and therefore human beings obtain their identity by becoming ac-
countable for their relationships. 8 In short, mediating institutions
teach us that we are relational, not autonomous beings. Because we
are relational beings, our very "self" is dependent upon ethical re-
sponsibilities.9 In mediating institutions, we develop bonds of affec-
tion that motivate individuals to treat others well. Writing in a
popular vein, Tom Chappell explains this educational process and re-
lates it to business:
In the family, we learn love, patience, respect, nurturing, affirma-
tion, and health. The family also teaches us about competition,
domination, selfishness, and deceit. The family is thus a relatively
efficient learning system for the development of mind, spirit, and
body.... Substitute the word company for family... and you get
an idea of what I envision a company to include. In my experience,
employees will run through walls for a company that understands
them, gives them some freedom, encourages their creativity, appre-
ciates their work, and rewards it fairly. Treat an employee like a cog
in a machine, and you'll get a cog's work. Treat that same person as
a member of your family, and you'll get loyalty.10
6 Timothy L. Fort, Business as Mediating Institution, 6 Bus. ETHIcs Q. 149 (1996).
7 See id. at 152.
8 In this regard, Business as Mediating Institutions theory is much like that of
some contemporary feminist theories. The feminist version of stakeholder theory, in
fact, develops this notion and will be described in Section II. I have definite affinities
with some parts of feminist thought, and it may well be that a mediating institutions
theory can be assisted by an integration of the two. That focus on relationality is not
the source for mediating institutions in this paper nor in the sources cited in this
paper, so that integration will not be done here.
9 For an even more sweeping statement of our relational sense, see ERROL E.
HARRIS, FORMAL, TRANSCENDENTAL & DIAICTICAs. Taniuuuo: Looic AND RxEu.'ry
(1987). Harris argues that the entire physical, biological, and even logical structure
of the world is "dialectical" (Harris' philosophical term for what is essentially relation-
ality). Thus, it is not simply that human beings are relational, but the entire physical
and philosophical world is a series of complex interrelationships.
10 TOM CHAPPEL, THE SOUL OF A BUSmISS: MANAGING FOR PROFIT AND THE COM.
MON GOOD 61-62 (1993).
19971
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
Although the process is traditionally associated with institutions
such as family, church, and the local community," businesses ought
to be mediating institutions as well. That is, businesses ought to rec-
ognize that the very identities of those working in them are developed
by work in the institution. When one realizes that relationships with
others comprise one's identity, then one has a richer notion of re-
sponsibility. While one must be careful not to conflate mediating in-
stitutions like family with business, corporations can benefit from
modeling at least some of its structure according to a mediating
model.
A manager who "sees" that her person is affected by just relations
with employees learns to inculcate responsibility just as a parent's
identity is developed by being responsible for a child who has (at least
sometimes) less power. Managers learn that their "selves" are tied up
with those who are lower on the corporate hierarchy. In a dialectical
sense, employees who have more power may also be more likely to
empathize with the needs of managers.
Although a bit oversimplified, the connection between organiza-
tions structured as mediating institutions and ethics can be described
as follows:
A company committed to ethics as well as profit needs to affirm that
knowledge of ethics... comes not from a course in organizational
behavior in a business school (or from a "business ethics" course)
but from the bonds formed in the family, the church, the schools,
the neighborhood, and self-help groups. As persons, we are in a
web of beliefs, traditions, and religious and cultural values.12
Why should businesses be mediating institutions? In addition to
the notion that they generally promote affections leading to ethical
treatment of others, there are several other reasons as well. By being a
mediating institution, the importance of the individual person is em-
phasized.13 Businesses accept the responsibility for the cost of its
"takeover" of leisure time otherwise devoted to traditional mediating
institutions.' 4 One creates a model for multicultural understanding
through the assemblage of diverse workers within a single commu-
11 See Fort, supra note 6, at 156.
12 CHAPPELL, supra note 10, at 71.
13 See Fort, supra note 6, at 155-57.
14 See id. (notingJuLET B. SCHOR, THE OVERWORKED AMERICAN: THE UNEXPECTED
DECLINE OF LEIsURE (1991)) (Schor argues that contrary to expectations that technol-
ogy leads to leisure, it leads to more time for workers working. Thus, capitalism has
led to less time for family and other mediating institutions.).
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nity.' 5 Individuals learn responsibilities as well as claiming rights.16
Contemporary management techniques such as Total Quality Man-
agement demonstrate the efficacy of participation of individuals to-
wards a collective good.'7 Such an organization raises the "stakes" of
its members by more closely connecting individual and organizational
endsI8 so that ethics is not a separate activity of business, but a consti-
tutive element of every day business life.' 9 Through these structures,
the bonds of affections make ethics habitual.20
While there will be a good deal of debate about whether constitu-
ents such as part-time employees are "internal" or "external," there
ought to be a heightened ability for shareholders and employees to
control the firm and, more particularly for employees, their work
product. Other duties to external constituents (such as the welfare of
a host community) may be represented by the concerns of employees
themselves who are members of both the corporate and geographical
community. The corporation ought to be structured so as to require
both shareholders and employees to have significant control of the
organization in which they work.
C. Methodology of the Article
This Article is neither descriptive nor interpretative. Rather than
delineating the differences between the various state constituency stat-
utes, or detailing the differences between the variations of stakeholder
theory (except in brief), or analyzing the ways courts have interpreted
the statutes, the Article argues that corporations ought to be operated
for the primary benefit of all internal constituents. The Article leaves
open the question of whether fiduciary duties or employee represen-
tation on the board is the better mechanism for actualizing the medi-
ating organization. I do use employee participation in this Article for
purposes of brevity (and because I suspect that I will eventually come
15 See id. (noting RONALD TAKAXI, A DaRrNT MnIRoR: A HISrORY OF MuI..ncuL-
TURAL AMzRiPCA (1993)) (Takaki argues that as diverse as Americans are, their com-
mon meeting ground has always been work. It is "on the job" that we become more
multiculturally integrated.).
16 See id. It is one (important) thing to learn that everyone has certain rights. It
is another to realize that those rights are not the totality of identity. If it were, a rights
position would suggest that we are autonomous beings that should be left alone. If it
is not, then in addition to rights, we understand our responsibilities in this complex
web of relationality.
17 See id.
18 See Fort, supra note 3, at 284-85.
19 See Fort, supra note 6, at 159.
20 See id. (noting Cmas'paj, supra note 10, at 71).
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down in favor of this mechanism instead of relying upon fiduciary du-
ties). The Article is therefore normative. Other duties may be deriva-
tive of those mandatory duties or may be expressed in other specific
legislation.
To make this argument, the Article makes the following moves:
First, it briefly describes corporate constituency statutes and the de-
bate concerning them. Next the debate is enriched by attempting an
understanding of the normative positions taken in the debate con-
cerning stakeholder theory. Finally, it proposes the concept of Busi-
ness as Mediating Institution (also called Mediating Institutions
approach) that provides a limited model of stakeholder management,
but one grounded in prudential and normative rationales so as to
make stakeholder theory a workable model for business ethics and
corporate governance.
II. CORPORATE CONSTITUENCY STATUTES
A. What They Are and Why They Were Enacted
Corporate Constituency Statutes have been enacted in over half
the states2' and have generated significant academic commentary.22
They are, however, only the latest round in a very old debate. While
tracing their origin to the charter amendments of the 1970S23 and to
the opposition of the corporate takeovers of the 1980s, 24 the debate is
probably best known in the Berle-Dodd debates of the 1930s. 25 In
fact, the notion of what the corporation is has changed throughout
American history so that it extends into history even further:
Over the past two hundred years, the prevailing conception of the
nature and purpose of the corporation and, thus, of the nature of
21 See note 2.
22 In addition to other material cited in this paper, see, for example, Walter M.
Cabot, The Free Market Promotes Long-Term Efficiency That Benefits All Stakeholders, 21
STETSON L. REV. 245 (1991); Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Theoretical and PracticalFramework
for Enforcing Corporate Constituency Statutes, 70 TEx. L. REv. 579 (1992); Edward D. Rod-
gers, Striking the Wrong Balance: Constituency Statutes and Corporate Governance, 21 PEPP.
L. REv. 777 (1994); David A. Ruder, Public Obligations of Private Corporations, 114 U. PA.
L. REv. 209 (1965); Steven M.H. Walman, The Proer Interpretation of Corporate Constitu-
ency Statutes and Formulation of DirectorDuties, 21 STETSON L. REv. 163 (1991); Gary von
Stange, Corporate Social Responsibility Through Constituency Statutes: Legend or Lie0, 11
HoFsTRA LAB. L.J. 461 (1994).
23 See Orts, supra note 4, at 20.
24 See id. at 23-26.
25 See AA. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REv. 1049
(1931); E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees, 45 HARv. L.
REV. 1145 (1932).
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the duties owed by corporate directors has changed dramatically.
The notion that the directors' primary duty is to act on behalf of the
interests of the share-holders-the putative "owners" of the corpora-
tion-represents but one approach. Over time, the law developed
alternatives to this approach.
26
The judicial source for this malleability is ChiefJustice John Mar-
shall's Dartmouth College opinion in which he ruled that a corporation
is an artificial creation of the state and thus subject to whatever duties
the state imposes upon it.27 This reason, along with other more philo-
sophical rationales, prompts business ethicist John Boatright to de-
clare that "except for the useful role they play in corporate
governance, there is nothing special about shareholders."28 We, or at
least a legislature, can alter corporate duties; they are not immutable
laws of nature. 2 9
When the duties of corporations are viewed in the light of a pub-
lic policy struggle,3 0 the stage is set for the fierce polemic of politics, a
fact that explains Eric Orts' conclusion that commentators have
tended toward extremism.3 ' I do not wish to join that battle, but to
suggest that there is a moderate (mediating) position that has pruden-
tial and moral advantages.
The rationale for the statutes is simply that corporate actions af-
fect and have always affected (often significantly) nonshareholders.
Whether the corporate decision is "downsizing" or discharging toxic
waste, nonshareholders feel the impacts of this artificial creation of
the state. In the wake of the takeovers of the past decades, those non-
shareholder constituents have sought protection from their legisla-
26 Thomas J. Bamonte, The Meaning of the "Corporate Constituency" Provision of the
Illinois Business Corporation Act; 27 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 14 (1995) (footnote omitted).
27 The seminal portion of Marshall's opinion reads:
A corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in
contemplation of law. Being the mere creature of law, it possesses only those
properties which the charter of its creation confers upon it, either expressly,
or as incidental to its very existence. These are such as are supposed best
calculated to effect the object for which it was created.
Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 636, 4 Wheat. 250, 303
(1819).
28 John Boatright, What's So Special About Shareholders?, 4 Bus. ETics Q. 393, 405
(1994).
29 This is not to suggest, however, that there may not be recurring problems in
business or recurring values in business that do take on the character of immutability.
It simply acknowledges that we are culturally able to specify the particular things that
corporations ought to do in our specific society.
30 SeeBoatright, supra note 28. Boatright concludes that there is no moral superi-
ority of extending duties solely to shareholders. Instead, it is a matter of public policy.
31 Orts, supra note 4, at 71.
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tures.3 2 Given the pain corporate decisions can cause in human lives
and in communities, and given the legal precedent for the malleabil-
ity of corporate duties, what could be wrong with requiring corpora-
tions to take into account the impact of their actions on
nonshareholder constituents? One can summarize four key reasons.
B. Four Problems with the Statutes
1. Too Many Masters
First, when one requires a corporation to take into account all
the stakeholders affected by an action, one creates "too many masters"
for management.3 3 That is, having many bosses makes it difficult for
management to effectively and fairly manage the firm. This could
happen in two ways.
One way is that the statutes will allow managers to play constitu-
encies against one another, thereby enhancing managerial discre-
tion. 34 The second way is that multiple constituents, if actually
powerful, could create corporate gridlock, allowing nothing to get
done.3 5 Either result does little to protect those that the statutes are
presumably designed to protect. If either result is true, the statutes
could even make things worse.
Is this criticism valid? Jonathan Macey argues that it is over-
stated.36 Macey argues that managers typically have to deal with many
conflicting goals and masters.3 7 Balancing multiple forces, such as
shareholders, bondholders, and other creditors, does not necessarily
overburden management.
While this may be true, any organization's ability to respond to
multiple demands is finite. Corporations may be able to process de-
mands of some additional constituents, such as employees, but can
they process the demands of community organizations, suppliers, cus-
32 See id. at 24. Orts argues that Rustbelt states such as Pennsylvania, Ohio, Wis-
consin, Indiana, Minnesota, and Illinois were among the leaders in passing constitu-
ency statutes. (citing John C. Coffee, Jr., The Uncertain Case for Takeover Reform: An
Essay on Stockholders, Stakeholders and Bust-ups, 1988 Wis. L. REV. 435, 436).
33 See, e.g., ROBERT CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 1.2.4, at 21-22 (1986).
34 See Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Employees as Stakeholders Under State Non-
shareholder Constituency Statutes, 21 STETSON L. REV. 45, 54-55, 70-71 (1991).
35 See, e.g., James J. Hanks, Jr., Playing with Fire: Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes
in the 1990s, 21 STETSON L. REV. 97, 111 (1991).
36 Jonathan K. Macey, An Economic Analysis of the Various Rationales for Making
Shareholders the Exclusive Beneficiaries of Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 21 STETSON L. REV. 23
(1991).
37 Id. at 33.
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tomers, governments, and (in the case of environmental matters) con-
stituents who may not be born for years to come?
While I am open to models that can make such a complex inte-
gration, it may well be true that if we wish corporations to be produc-
tive organizations, there may be limits to the number of constituents
they can serve. One reason for a mediating model is that it limits the
number of constituents to whom management is accountable; that
limitation, however, may be sufficient for management to fulfill such
responsibilities.
2. Slippery Slope to Socialism?
If a model can integrate these various constituencies contem-
plated by the states, is it still a corporation? This leads to the second
problem for constituency statutes and the further development of a
mediating notion of stakeholder theory. A corporation that fully en-
gages all its affected constituents requires business to be an "unelected
governmental entity."38 As F.A. Hayek argued:
So long as the management has the one overriding duty of adminis-
tering the resources under its control as trustees for the sharehold-
ers and for their benefit, its hands are largely tied; and it will have
no arbitrary power to benefit this or that particular interest. But
once the management of a big enterprise is regarded as not only
entitled but even obliged to consider in its decisions whatever is re-
garded as the public or social interest, or to support good causes
and generally to act for the public benefit, it gains indeed an uncon-
trollable power-a power which could not long be left in the hands
of private managers but would inevitably be made the subject of
increasing public control.39
Implicit in this criticism is the fear of socialism. If private prop-
erty of shareholders must be used for purposes other than what they
desire, then their money has been, in some sense, confiscated. 40
Moreover, if corporations do become redistributive vehicles, society is
not likely to allow such distribution to take place without giving those
constituents a voice. Hayek's "slippery slope" argument states the
public is not likely to entrust corporate executives with such power.
The logical next step, then, is public control of corporations.
38 See Nell Minow, Shareholders, Stakeholders, and Boards of Directors, 21 STETSON L.
REv. 197, 219 (1991).
39 3 F. A. HAYEr, LAW, LEGISLATION, LIBERTI: THE POLIrICAL ORDER OF A FREE
PEOPLE 82 (1979).
40 It is for this reason that, although unlikely to be upheld by the courts, a "tak-
ings" problem might exist.
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As the statutes are currently written, these concerns seem over-
drawn. Most statutes simply permit, but do not mandate, the consid-
eration of nonshareholders. Even if such duties were mandated in
part, such as through employee representation on the board of direc-
tors, one could argue that the corporation, like a state, becomes more
autonomous, not less. That is, there may be less reason for the state to
micromanage corporate affairs if the corporation itself is a more just
organizational structure. The danger of socialist collectivism is not in
making individuals accountable for their actions, but in undermining
accountability itself. It may well be true that "too many masters" un-
dermine accountability But making management accountable to em-
ployees can make the corporation more independent from state
control.
In limiting attention to employees, external stakeholders remain
represented by forces that can have an impact on the corporation. 41
The environment can be protected through a variety of legal mecha-
nisms. Special protection of employees does not eliminate the fact
that legal or economic incentives (economic in the sense that there
can be good business reasons for being ethical in terms of goodwill
and reputation) 42 may foster corporate responsibility. Moreover, if
employees have a say in corporate decisionmaking, then they are
likely to consider concerns, such as community welfare, important for
corporate action. Indirectly, they also represent the community of
which they are a part. The effect on external constituents may not be
as great as one might fear. The mediating approach allows for social
accountability without socialism.
3. Adjudicatory versus Utilitarian Rationality
A third criticism of the statutes concerns the way in which corpo-
rations operate. Joseph Biancalana argues that corporations operate
according to a "utilitarian rationality" maximizing preferences as op-
posed to "adjudicatory rationality" which depends upon normative
reasoning.43 Simply put, corporations are not designed to determine
justice or fairness. They maximize preferences within the context of
normative rules established by others. Because preferences are so
fluid, a utilitarian rationality is not able to make normative judgments
unless those judgments are imposed, such as in the traditional legal
41 See Macey, supra note 36, at 41-44.
42 "Market forces provide the strongest restraints on the discretion of corporate
directors." Bamonte, supra note 26, at 17.
43 Joseph Biancalana, Defining the Proper Corporate Constituency: Asking the Wrong
Question, 59 U. GIN. L. REV. 425, 429-30 (1990).
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doctrine of ultre vires actions.44 Without such specificity, vague no-
tions of "fairness" supply no criteria for regulating corporate actions,
and actually undermine notions of fiduciary duty.45
This criticism, of course, begs the question of how corporations
actually do operate. Are they economic preference maximizers or
something else? For purposes of this argument, let us assume that
they are preference maximizers. While Biancalana identifies one way
to set limits to this utilitarianism-through specific legal constraints-
the other way is to broaden the preferences that are maximized. This
is exactly what stakeholder theory does. It expands relevant prefer-
ences. The problem with utilitarianism is the problem of determining
whose preferences are, in fact, being maximized and at whose ex-
pense. For what "number" is a "greatest good" being sought? Corpo-
rate constituency statutes suggest that one must ask nonshareholders
this question.
It is, however, practically impossible to ask all of one's suppliers
or representatives of future generations (regarding environmental is-
sues). But it is not so difficult to consult internal members of the
organization. A mediating approach thus broadens the concern of a
preference maximizing entity without making stakeholder theory
impractical.
4. Do the Statutes Make a Difference?
Finally, William Camey has argued that corporate constituency
statutes will not make a difference in a corporation's decision because
an "enlightened board" will have already factored in the best interests
of all parties.46 This may well be true, but it begs the question of
whether a board is enlightened. The fact that many boards are not
enlightened suggests that they need a framework which will require
them to become enlightened. In interpreting Illinois' corporate con-
stituency statutes, for instance, Thomas Bamonte writes that the legis-
lature was not convinced that boards were already enlightened. Thus
directors needed direction toward the correct scope of their duties:
Illinois law already allowed directors to consider nonshareholder in-
terests using a long-term perspective within a framework in which
the directors are to serve "the best interests of the corporation and
the stockholders." Thus, if all section 8.85 did was to codify the
existing common law rules, it was hardly necessary....
44 See id. at 434-36.
45 Seeid.
46 William J. Carney, Does Defining Constituencies Matter2, 59 U. CN. L. REv. 385
(1990).
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Section 8.85 does, in fact, do more. . . . [It] establishes that the
director's primary fiduciary duty is to the corporate entity. This, in
turn, reduces the status of shareholders to a position of one among
a set of corporate constituents....
• .. The most popular formulation in Illinois case law, however,
suggested that directors and officers owe a fiduciary duty to the cor-
poration and to the shareholders. 47
If a board is already "enlightened," then the statutes should pose
no particular burden on it. Such boards will continue to operate as
they always have. If such boards are not "enlightened," then the stat-
utes require them to become enlightened.
C. Corporate Constituency Statutes: A Summary
There are important truths to these criticisms of the statutes.
They may create too many masters. Corporations may become
unelected and unaccountable public bodies. The statutes may con-
fuse the very ways in which corporations work. But a limited notion
that requires managers to take into account internal constituents-
shareholders and employees-dramatically simplifies these concerns.
Business as Mediating Institution, which looks primarily to internal
constituents, may allow corporate constituency statutes to avoid these
typical critiques while significantly expanding the responsibilities of
management.
In addition to the benefits of avoiding these criticisms, there are
positive, normative reasons for the mediating institution approach.
These can be better addressed within the context of the business eth-
ics debate regarding stakeholder theory.
III. STAKEHOLDER THEORY
A. The Theory and its Development
As with the statutes, stakeholder theory argues that the corpora-
tion ought to be managed for the benefit of all affected by corporate
actions, not simply the shareholders. The origins of the theory lay in a
Kantian principle that all human beings should be treated as ends,
not as means to ends.48 This was extended to what is known as the
stakeholder theory of the firm in which managers owe fiduciary duties
to stakeholders as well as shareholders. 49
47 Bamonte, supra note 26, at 9-10 (quoting Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776,
780 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968)) (footnotes omitted).
48 See Evan & Freeman, supra note 1, at 101-05.
49 See id.
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Evan and Freeman summarize their theory first in terms of the
"Principle of Corporate Legitimacy," in which the corporation should
be managed for the benefit of all its stakeholders and that those stake-
holders (customers, suppliers, owners, employees, and local commu-
nities) ought to participate in the decisions that substantially affect
them.50 Second, the "Stakeholder Fiduciary Principle" places a fiduci-
ary duty on management toward the stakeholders of the corporation
as an entity in safeguarding the long-term stakes of each constituent
group. 51
Who comprises the stakeholder group? Drawing on the previ-
ously mentioned Berle-Dodd debate (and demonstrating the linkage
between corporate constituency statutes and stakeholder theory),
Boatright says that "Dodd's position (and Freeman's, as well) is that
the fiduciary duties of management should be extended now to in-
clude all other constituents."52
Stakeholder theory has been amended in various ways by those
who would retain fiduciary duties toward shareholders and extend im-
portant, but non-fiduciary, duties to other stakeholders.53 Others, as
we have seen, argue that there is nothing morally special about share-
holders; our imposition of fiduciary duties is a choice of public policy
that could just as easily be extended to various other stakeholders.54
Recent stakeholder theory has gone beyond the Kantian commitment
to persons to embrace a feminist theory of the firm. In this theory,
our very "self" is understood as being relationally interconnected with
others:
Persons are fundamentally connected with each other in a web of
relationships which are themselves integral to any proper under-
standing of "the self," such that any talk of autonomy or search for
personal identity must be qualified and located within this more
organic and relational sense of the world. The stakeholder concept,
understood in feminist terms, makes explicit how the boundaries of
the self extend into areas far beyond what we can easily recognize
and into areas clearly "outside" the corporation. 55
According to this approach, corporations should incorporate a
variety of internal and stakeholder concerns. Thus, in responding to
50 See id.
51 See id.
52 Boatright, supra note 28, at 402.
53 See Kenneth E. Goodpaster, Business Ethics and Stakeholder Analysis, 1 Bus. ETH-
ics Q. 53 (1991).
54 See generally Boatright, supra note 28.
55 Andrew C. Wicks et al., A Feminist Reinterpretation of the Stakeholder Concpt, 4
Bus. ETmcs Q. 459, 483 (1994).
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the question of what managers should do, Wicks, Freeman, and Gil-
bert argue that "[w] e advocate that managers drop the quest for ob-
jectivity and embrace the quest for solidarity and communicatively
shared understandings. '56
This feminist reinterpretation is subject to the same difficulties of
"too many masters" and the other criticisms of the previous section.
But it makes a significant advance in understanding the communal
notion of the self. Human selfhood is not simply autonomous, if it is
at all, but is stitched together through interaction with others in a
community.57
The question is, to what extent the self can cognitively embrace
the myriad sets of relationships that comprise it. Beyond the notion
of "bounded rationality,"58 which suggests cognitive limitations in our
ability to process such information, this is a question that I must in
large part defer to psychologists. Nevertheless, there is a clue to our
cognitive abilities to be relational beings when we examine our evolu-
tion. As Charles Taylor writes, contrary to the contemporary context
in which "identity" is gained through the exchanges one makes in an
anonymous market, "[i]n premodern times, people didn't speak of
'identity' .. .- not because people didn't have (what we call) identi-
ties, .... but rather because these were then too unproblematic to be
thematized as such."59
While the evolutionary element will be addressed further in the
naturalist critique of stakeholder theory, it is worth asking what it is
about contemporary life that makes the anonymous market unable to
create a mechanism for persons to achieve identity. Why do non-
shareholder constituents have a claim to a greater role in corporate
governance? These questions can be answered in a more systematic
critique of stakeholder theory.
B. Four Critiques of Stakeholder Theory
1. The Agency Critique
The most direct critique of stakeholder theory comes from
agency theory and is utilized in defense of a free market approach
that directs fiduciary duties only toward shareholders. According to
this theory, agents have moral duties to carry out the instructions of
56 Id. at 490.
57 See Fort, supra note 6, at 265-70.
58 See generally 1 HERBERT A. SIMON, MODELS OF BOUNDED RATIONALITY: ECONOMIC
ANALYSIs AND PUBLIC POLICY (1982).
59 CHARLEs TAYLOR, MuLTIcuURAIusM AND "THE PoLncs OF RECOGNITION" 35
(1992).
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their principals. Anyone is free to establish a corporation and those
who decide to take such a risk (shareholders) ought to have their in-
structions carried out by agents who have decided not to take the risk
of investing in a business. Thus, according to Ian Maitland, corpora-
tions do not violate stakeholders' rights to self-determination, but are
the result of stakeholders who choose to form or invest in a corpora-
tion rather than choosing to do something else.60 If nonshareholders
want to become shareholders, they can do so. If they do not, then
they can choose to carry out the mandates of those who have become
shareholders.
Rejecting the stakeholder position that current corporate struc-
ture defeats individual stakeholders' rights to self-determination,
Maitland argues:
[W] hat on its face is a disagreement about the ethics of the internal
constitutional arrangements of corporations is really an empirical
disagreement about the efficacy of the competitive marketplace at
protecting the right of stakeholders to self-determination. Both
sides endorse the principle of self-determination-but they disagree
about whether the corporation respects that principle. 61
Thus, one argument against stakeholder theory is that it ignores the
free choices that were made to establish corporations. Moreover, an
agency approach does not harm self-determination according to
Maitland, but as an empirical matter, better protects it.
As an empirical matter, Maitland offers evidence that employee-
run firms and cooperatives do not seem to possess competitive advan-
tages when, if it is true that participatory management is a preferable
way of organizing corporations, it should. "Employee participation in
firm governance should elicit greater commitment and work effort, so
cooperative firms should have a competitive advantage over their hier-
archical rivals .... But despite their supposed attractiveness to em-
ployees, such firms have repeatedly failed." 62
There are two difficulties with this argument First, although
Maitland also acknowledges that employees may be willing to sacrifice
efficiency in a tradeoff to obtain governance input,63 he leaves the
criteria for determining how well employee-run companies protect
rights to self-determination in terms of economic, competitive advan-
tages. Of course, there is a truth to this position: without competitive
60 Ian Maitland, The Morality of the Corporation: An Empirical or Normative Disagree-
ment?, 4 Bus. ETmcs Q. 445, 455 (1994).
61 Id.
62 Id. at 453.
63 Id.
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advantages, there may not be a business organization in which anyone
will have lights to self-determination. But to more accurately deter-
mine if such structures do better protect self-determination, one
would need to evaluate other criteria supplied by those who work for
the firm. Employees, for instance, may not make competitive advan-
tages a high priority. This may make the companies less profitable,
but better places to work.
The second and more important point is that the determination
to become an investor does not prescribe the totality of duties that
result from such a decision. Deciding to become an investor is an
important decision, the risk of which ought to be compensated (for
instance in the form of capital growth). But a person may not have
capital to invest and thus may not be able to choose. Even if an indi-
vidual has made such a choice, the principal-agency relationship re-
mains a relationship. As a relationship, one must at least hear the
concerns of the other party in the relationship. Neither a principal
alone nor a law can hear. Thus, Cohen is right to argue that:
The process of making a decision about what is to the advantage of
a group or what advances that group's welfare should often (usually)
involve considering that group s opinion. There are at least two rea-
sons for this, the first (and maybe also the second) of which was
advocated byJohn Stuart Mill. (1) That group is usually particularly
well-placed to evaluate what is and what is not in its own interest. By
itself, this concern has nothing to do with respect for agent-auton-
omy. (2) In many matters involving some decision procedure, there
is no single exclusively rational decision. There can be a number of
possibilities. 64
An example of the complexity of stakeholder voice and self-deter-
mination can be seen in another institution that can be a mediating
organization: the military. When a soldierjoins the military, there are
clear rules he must follow. Even if one has voluntarily joined (as op-
posed to having been conscripted), there are very specific roles a sol-
dier must carry out. As such, her position is very much like an agent/
employee who has decided to join a corporation rather than set up
her own company
Being in such an organization, however, neither allows the
agent/soldier to comply exclusively with the orders of superiors nor
does it allow superiors to ignore the welfare of the soldiers. The Nu-
remberg Trials demonstrated that soldiers have a duty to question
some orders of their superiors. The ancient Chinese general Sun-Tzu
64 Stephen Cohen, Stakeholders and Consent Bus. & PROF. ETHICS J., Spring 1995,
at 3, 13 (footnote omitted).
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argued that a primary responsibility of a general is to treat soldiers
with warmth and beneficence. 65 If an organization as hierarchical as
the military requires "stakeholder" input, responsibility, and concern,
then corporations ought to at least allow employees to have a voice in
corporate governance.
There is no doubt that competition and contracting can protect
many nonshareholder interests, as agency theory would suggest. But
with less than twenty percent of the American workforce unionized,66
this strength of contract may not be what it once was. In retirement
years, employees are particularly vulnerable. 67 Traditional con-
tracting and competition mechanisms may not be sufficient to give
employees the voice that accurately reflects their "stake" in the
organization.
Moreover, recent downsizing activities, such as AT&T's, may have
evolved into a different form had employees had a greater voice. This
is not to argue that workers cannot be fired, but it is to argue that
employee participation is necessary for proper protection in today's
economy.
In short, while Maitland may have a point that agency theory pro-
tects the right to self-determination, it only does so incompletely. Em-
pirical evidence even shows that there may be advantages to including
more employee control of the firm.68
2. The Social Contract Critique
For Thomas Donaldson and Thomas Dunfee, stakeholder theory
suffers from two problems. First, it does not consider the community
standards in describing an account of business ethics, and second, it
does not have any normative foundation to determine who counts as
stakeholders and what weight ought to be given to particular stake-
holders. 69 At least in part because of these weaknesses, Donaldson
and Dunfee offer their Integrative Social Contracts Theory (ISCT),
65 SuN-Tzu, Tim ART OF WAR (Samuel B. Griffith trans., Oxford Univ. Press
1963). In the fourth paragraph of Sun-Tzu's work, he writes that leaders must have
moral influence so that people are in harmony with their leaders. Id. at 64.
66 See Van Wezel Stone, supra note 34, at 54.
67 See id. at 49-51.
68 See, e.g., W. EDvARDS DEMING, OUT OF THE CRISIS 83-85 (1986); CHARLES
HAMPDEN-TuRNER, CRFATING CORPORATE CULTURE: FROM DISCORD TO HARMONY 58-59
(1990).
69 See generally Thomas Donaldson & Thomas W. Dunfee, Toward aUnified Concep-
tion of Business Ethics: Integrative Social Contracts Theory, 19 AcAD. MGMT. REv. 252
(1994).
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which attempts to specify weights and duties according to extant social
contracts constrained by universal hypernorms. 70
Where do contracting relations take place? All over, of course,
but in particular, the specification of rights and duties occurs within a
community. In mediating institutions such as families, churches, and
voluntary organizations, individuals learn the impact of their actions,
and learn to internalize their responsibilities. 71 Through community
interaction, one learns to contract with others.
For instance, a person who wants to volunteer for her church's
soup kitchen does not thereby become a minister in charge of the
entire church. Instead, she learns the duties of a role specified
through ongoing contracts between the church and the leaders of the
soup kitchen, between the leaders of the kitchen and the volunteers,
between volunteers and the recipients of the food, and a myriad of
other agreements. Those contracts develop the character of the par-
ticipants. In short, community life requires ongoing contracts be-
tween the various stakeholders of the institution. Mediating
institutions require social contracting.
Ultimately, in fact, one learns to contract with one's self while
internalizing the responsibilities one has to other members of the
community. In negotiating what activities are acceptable and unac-
ceptable, an individual gradually, although not inevitably, develops a
character which internally regulates one's behavior. That is, one de-
velops a conscience. 72
ISCT attempts to provide a specificity in terms of what duties
ought to have more weight. In a mediating institution's framework,
one's community-including a corporation-takes priority. Whatever
the relationship may be among various external stakeholders, the in-
ternal stakeholders are a community.73 The place where one is most
likely to learn ethical duties toward others is, first, in one's commu-
nity. The place where business is likely to develop ethical behavior is
also internal.
70 Id.
71 See generally RICHARD JOHN NEUHAUS, DOING WELL DOING GOOD: THE CHAL-
LENGE TO THE CHRISTIAN CAPrrALIsT (1992).
72 It may also be true that conscience is an inherent aspect of human nature. I
would support that view in fact. But it is also at least in part the result of the internal-
ization of the results of having been "caught" by others in a community. A child who
is disciplined for hitting a sibling, for instance, may eventually internalize the notion
that she should not hit her brother, regardless of whether or not she could get away
with it.
73 See EDWIN M. HARTMAN, ORGANIzATIoNAL ETHICS AND THE GOOD LIFE (1996);
ROBERT SOLMON, ETHICS AND EXCELLENCE (1992).
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A common way of describing this today is as "corporate cul-
ture."74 A company's culture can hold it together in the midst of tur-
moils such as decentralization, de-layering, and downsizing.75 To be
sure, individual companies have much different cultures; they are not
identical.7 6 Different as they may be, however, a corporate culture is
important to the individuals who comprise it because a sense of com-
munity matters to people:
Culture, in a word, is community. It is an outcome of how people
relate to one another. Communities exist at work just as they do
outside the commercial arena. Like families, villages, schools, and
clubs, businesses rest on patterns of social interaction that sustain
them over time or are their undoing. They are built on shared in-
terests and mutual obligations and thrive on cooperation and
friendships.77
At the heart of Donaldson and Dunfee's respect for community is
an understanding of human nature which becomes particularly po-
tent in an emerging naturalist approach to business ethics.
3. Naturalist Critique
In his recent book, Values, Nature, and Culture in the American Cor-
poration, William Frederick somewhat whimsically summarizes contem-
porary business ethics in the formula: EBB= f(Rk+Jr+U) where EBB
stands for Ethical Business Behavior.78 In this "Philosophers'
Formula," ethical business is a function of Kantian rights (Rk), Rawl-
sian justice (J,), and utilitarianism (U).79 While the characterization
has limits, it does roughly characterize the field. Most business ethics
theories do not simply address one of these elements but emphasize
certain elements within the formula.
Methodologically, Frederick uses the natural world of biology and
physics as a resource for moral reflection. By experiencing the natu-
ral world, we reflect on it and better understand certain values that
exist in all nature, including human beings who are part of nature.80
These values include economizing, ecologizing, and power-aggrandiz-
74 SeeRob Goffee & GarethJones, What Holds the Modern Company Together?, HAv.
Bus. REv., Nov.-Dec. 1996, at 133.
75 See id.
76 See id. at 133-34.
77 Id. at 134.
78 WnmAm C. FREDERIC, VALUES, NATURE, AND CULTURE IN THE AMEICAN CoR1o-
RATION 251 (1995).
79 Id.
80 See generally FREDERIMCK, supra note 78.
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ing.81 Most ethicists concern themselves with ecologizing (commu-
nity-building) values. But in addition to a broader conception of
ecology, Frederick also stresses the natural importance of "economiz-
ing," the conversion of resources into materials that sustain our very
lives.8 2 By recognizing economizing as a natural value, Frederick ele-
vates its importance. This makes a big difference to his understanding
of justice.
Frederick argues that justice within a naturalist context is not
about decisions concerning distribution of particular goods. Instead,
justice is about the ability of stakeholders to participate in the coordi-
nation of economic enterprise.8 3 This approach recognizes the inher-
ent and legitimate economizing drives of all stakeholders. It focuses
on their involvement in an organizational process rather than a de-
lineation of status according to which distributive processes flow.8 4
Thus, rather than focusing on a Rawlsian theory of distributive justice
that imposes duties on those well-off, Frederick concentrates on legiti-
mizing the economizing participation of all members of nature. This
at least suggests the legitimacy of a greater participation of employees
in the decisions that affect them.
Frederick notes that his endorsement of the value of utility is the
area of biggest disagreement between himself and other ethicists.8 5
With economizing values central to survival in a naturalist theory, the
utility of corporate actions is not only something to put up with, but
the very justification for business. Without it, there would be no rea-
son for us to have business. It provides "the vital link between busi-
ness economizing and technologizing and the humanly vital needs
and satisfactions pursued by the members of the society."8 6 By endors-
ing utility and expanding it to include all persons by virtue of its "nat-
uralness," Frederick expands the preferences that a corporation must
maximize.8 7
It is worth taking Frederick's naturalism further. Some in evolu-
tionary psychology contend that human beings are not significantly
different from what our ancestors were like in the days in which we
lived in hunter-gatherer societies. As diverse as those societies may
81 Id. at 9.
82 Id. at 42-43.
83 Id. at 259-60.
84 Id. at 260-61.
85 Id. at 261.
86 Id. at 262.
87 See id. at 8.
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have been, they were small groups.8 8 For instance, hunting societies
were larger than one or two families, but they remained small.8 9 Per-
haps human beings need small groups in order to learn responsibili-
ties and duties rather than learning them through large anonymous
organizations such as the market or the legal system.
More specifically, some have demonstrated a relationship be-
tween the size of the human brain and the optimal size of groups to
which an individual can belong and process understandings of one's
place in the relationships of the group. Psychologist Robin Dunbar
found:
a correlation between the dimensions of the neocortex-the part of
the brain engaged in conscious thought-and the size of different
groupings of mammals....
In humans, Dunbar found, the size of the neocortex predicts [opti-
mal populations of] groups of about 150 people. This number hap-
pens to conform to the approximate membership of the clan within
hunter-gatherer societies; the company unit within the military; and
the aggregate of employees within a business that can be managed
without an elaborate bureaucracy. The figure of 150, Dunbar
writes, represents the maximum number of individuals with whom
"we can have a genuinely social relationship, the kind of relation-
ship that goes with knowing who they are and how they relate to
us."9 0
Dunbar further noted the work of anthropologists in the last cen-
tury who have found that hunter-gatherer societies did not simply live
in small groups, but that their groups were related to larger social
organizations. Thus, "overnight camps" of thirty to thirty-five people
(comprising five or six families) collaborate with other such groups
for hunting and foraging and ultimately belong to tribes of 1500 to
2000 people.9 ' This matrix ties together the already noted findings of
Jaynes and Turnbull to suggest that individuals find their identity best
in small organizations which can be linked to larger units.
Is this, however, a good idea? Anthropologist Lawrence Keeley
has studied the degree of violence in these small hunter-gatherer com-
88 See ROBERT WRGI, THE MORAL ANIMAL: EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY AND EVE-
RYDAY LIFE 38 (1994).
89 See CouN M. TURNBULL, THE FOREST PEOPLE: A STUDY OF THE PYGMIES OF THE
CONGO 37 (1962); see alsoJuLIANJAYNEs, THF OIGIN OF CONSCIOUSNESS IN THE BREAK-
DOWN OF THE BIcAMERAL MIND 129 (1976) (estimating the optimal number in such
groups to be approximately thirty).
90 Gary Stix, Different Strokes, Sci. AM., Nov. 1996, at 36 (reviewing Robin Dunbar's
GROOMING, Gossip, AND THE EVOLUTION OF LANGUAGE (1996)).
91 ROBIN DUNBAR, GROOMING, GOSSIP, AND THE EVOLUTION OF LANGUAGE 70
(1996).
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munities and has found the rate of deaths in warfare to be twenty
times higher than during the (what we call a bloody) twentieth cen-
tury.92 Clearly, the fostering of small groups in order to obtain a sense
of moral identity has to be circumscribed or else one's moral identity
can be gained through unacceptable behavior. Nevertheless, when
James Wilson finds that children in rural, economically simple com-
munities with strong kinship ties are more willing to help and comfort
others-not only within their group, but outside the group as well93 -
one can see that finding a place for small communities in order to
encourage moral development is not a bad idea either.
Speaking in the business context, perhaps we best learn our
moral responsibilities in small, mediating institutions in which there
are face-to-face consequences of our actions rather than in large, ab-
stract structures which are bound by rules that may seem to have little
to do with the everyday life of the individual person affected by
them.94 Of course, one cannot simply turn back the clock so as to put
92 LAWRENCE H. KEELEY, WAR BEFORE CIVILIZATION 93 (1996).
93 JAMEs Q. WLSON, THE MORAL SENSE 23, 41-42 (1993).
94 See Jacques Ellul, The Theological Foundation of Law 11-43 (1960). Ellul
makes a complex argument in which he links the legitimacy of law to the ability of
persons in the community to spontaneously identify with it.
He argues that in its origin, all law is religious. There is no separation between
the lawgiver and the religious leader, such as perhaps a shaman, of the society. Grad-
ually, however, the institutions of law and religion separate. There becomes a space
between the religious and governmental institutions, but there is extensive homoge-
neity among the people so that they "naturally" or spontaneously understand what is
right and wrong. Over time, however, scholars emerge who reflect upon the deci-
sions that have been made about right and wrong. These persons develop "princi-
ples" and "laws" to encapsulate what previously was a spontaneously lived
understanding of right and wrong. The problem with this scholarly distillation is that
once articulated, the principles become malleable. In particular, those with money
and power employ intelligent interpreters of the principles who interpret according
to the interests of the rich and powerful. This causes laws to increasingly become
divorced from the spontaneously understood "natural law" to become a set of rules
that are understood and manipulated only by the rich and powerful. At that point,
law ceases to be legitimate because the common people have no ability to connect
with it nor to influence it.
Although Ellul's argument may prove too much, there is a wisdom of tying law's
legitimacy to its meaning and to those who are affected by it. Without such a connec-
tion, law is indeed unjust and so viewed. A contemporary example of this is in the
public's reaction to the Internal Revenue Code which does indeed seem to be a bewil-
dering morass disconnected from the lives of everyday human beings.
In corporate terms, the same dynamic argues for rules and procedures that con-
nect with the lives of stakeholders. While international treaties and accords are im-
portant to global business, there also need to be laws within the control of those
affected by them if the laws themselves are to retain legitimacy.
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human beings into small tribes roaming the countryside. The point is
that within our large nation-states and corporations we need to foster
the communities, the mediating institutions, in which individuals have
some significant control over the rules of their community and learn
to internalize moral responsibilities.
While evolutionary psychology is geared toward explaining repro-
duction,95 our genetic similarity with our ancestors suggests that we do
need small groups to form our identity and to learn our moral respon-
sibilities. Evidence suggesting that the communication skills of such
small groups are almost entirely internal to one's community96 sug-
gests that we may be similarly disposed. While this point requires far
more consideration and expertise than I am able to provide here, I
would like to hypothesize that it is part of our human nature that we
need small groups to learn ethical duties. More abstract duties are
derivative of these more intimate lessons.
Rather than attempting to grasp our responsibilities to far-flung
stakeholder groups, perhaps our corporate responsibilities ought to
focus on those things which we are best able to do: develop corporate
communities with duties flowing primarily to internal members. This
is exactly the position of Business as Mediating Institution.
4. The Mediating Critique
Stakeholder theory incorporates a good deal of the Philosophers'
Formula. It attempts to protect Kantian commitments to the individ-
ual. It also incorporates utilitarianism. Evan and Freeman broaden
the scope of utilitarian analysis to include nonshareholder interests.
Evan and Freeman's approach, in other words, still operates under a
utilitarian rationality, but it is one based on stakeholder rather than
shareholder or managerial interests.
What kinds of needs would be raised by stakeholders? The spe-
cific needs, of course, would vary from company to company. But
there are certain basic human needs likely to be raised by stakehold-
ers if given the opportunity. Sociologist Robert Nisbet, for instance,
has written about the basic human social needs of affection, friend-
ship, prestige, and recognition. 97 These kinds of cooperative goods
have been traditionally met by mediating institutions such as families,
churches, and guilds,9 8 and in non-industrial societies within small
95 See WRIGHT, supra note 88.
96 SeeJ. BRONOWSIu, THE ASCENT OF MAN 45 (1973).
97 ROBERT A. NISBET, THE QUESr FOR CoMMUNr. A STUDY IN THE ETHICS OF OR-
DER AND FREEDOM 50 (2d ed. 1990).
98 Id. at 237.
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groups such as hunting groups.99 Modem psychologists have docu-
mented the non-economic needs of individuals in the workplace as
well. 100
These associational needs, primarily and best met in small, medi-
ating institutions are consistent with the Kantian approach taken in
stakeholder theory. The point is that corporations ought to be man-
aged so that individuals are treated as "ends" instead of as "means." A
mediating institutions approach, however, does question the extent to
which large organizations can meet associational needs unless the or-
ganization is structured in such a way so that sub-units of the organiza-
tions are themselves capable of meeting associational needs. A
mediating institutions approach would also question the extent of du-
ties one has. Rather than a set of open-ended duties to all stakehold-
ers affected by corporate action, it would place primary duties on
meeting the associational needs of internal constituents such as em-
ployees and shareholders. 101
IV. BUSINESS AS MEDIATING INSTITUTION
A. Mediating Institutions
To this point, I have argued that mediating institutions are com-
munities in which individuals have direct contact with others. They
witness the impact of one's actions on others. They provide a person
with a sense of identity and probably a common purpose. 10 2 Duties
are primarily directed toward internal constituents, an aspect which
can lead, it must be admitted, to problematic tribalism.
I do not wish to specify too precisely what mediating institutions
must look like structurally. Different communities, churches, and
families structure themselves in quite different ways. Just as Donald-
son and Dunfee propose "moral free space"10 3 for communities to de-
velop norms appropriate for themselves, so Business as Mediating
Institution proposes likewise.
99 See, e.g., JAYNES, supra note 89, at 129; TuRNBuLL, supra note 89, at 37; WRiGrr,
supra note 88, at 38-39.
100 See, e.g., FREDERICK HERZBERG, WORK AND THE NATURE OF MAN (1966); DAVID C.
MCCLELLAND & DAVID G. WINTER, MOTIVATING ECONOMIc AcHIEVEMENT (1971);
CHARLES R. WALKER & ROBERT H. GUEsT, THE MAN ON THE ASSEMBLY LINE (1952).
101 See generally Fort, supra note 3.
102 A traditional mediating institution, such as a church, has a common purpose
for its members. Voluntary organizations do also and, insofar as childrearing and
family affection is concerned, so do families. Corporations may also have a common
purpose of economic viability, if not profitability.
103 Donaldson & Dunfee, supra note 69, at 259-60.
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There are central elements, however, that apply to all mediating
institutions. Perhaps these are the same or closely related to Donald-
son and Dunfee's "hypernorms."'0 4 I do not wish to tackle that exten-
sive question here, but I do wish to suggest at least one such norm:
participation.
As natural law theoristJohn Finnis writes, "one who is never more
than a cog in big wheels turned by others is denied participation in
one important aspect of human well-being."' 0 5 This "natural law"
combined with Frederick's naturalist recognition that we are all enti-
fled to our economizing drives and the further naturalist notion that
we are best able to direct our moral duties toward internal members
suggests that Business as Mediating Institution may be a workable con-
ception of stakeholder theory. It also suggests that the right to partici-
pate in the decisions affecting one's life is a basic natural law that
ought to apply to corporations. In particular, it recognizes all constit-
uents who are members of a business community and stresses their
right to participate, particularly in the day-to-day work that will have
the most impact on a person. However, it keeps the number of con-
stituents at a more manageable level than full-blown stakeholder
responsibility.
B. Justifying Business as Mediating Institution
1. Justification Through Business Ethics Convergence
Business as Mediating Institution represents a convergence of
contemporary business ethics theories. It draws upon a limited notion
104 Id. at 265-66.
105 JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RiGHTs 147 (1980). Finnis goes on to
write:
It is therefore a fundamental aspect of general justice that common enter-
prises should be regarded, and practically conducted, not as ends in them-
selves but as means of assistance, as ways of helping individuals to "help
themselves" or, more precisely, to constitute themselves. And in all those
fields of activity, including economic activity, where individuals, or families,
or other relatively small groups, can help themselves by their own private
efforts and initiatives without thereby injuring (either by act or omission)
the common good, they are entitled to justice to be allowed to do so, and it
is unjust to require them to sacrifice their private initiative by demanding
that they participate instead in a public enterprise; it remains unjust even if
the material dividend they receive from the public enterprise is as great as or
even somewhat greater than the material product of their own private efforts
would have been. The principle of subsidiarity [which includes participa-
tion] is a principle ofjustice.
Id. at 169.
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of stakeholder theory. Like social contract theory and virtue the-
ory,10 6 it recognizes the importance of community determination of
proper behavior and the community's role at inculcating moral iden-
tity. It draws upon a human nature that requires small groups in or-
der to develop that identity and to stress the importance of
participation. There are other convergences worth noting that sub-
stantiate the validity of viewing businesses as mediating institutions.
10 7
2. Justification Through Religion, Nature, and Philosophy
When one looks at world religions, sociology, and philosophy,
one can see a repeated emphasis on duty toward those with whom one
is closest. Japanese and Aristotelian notions are worth noting.
Aristotle notes concentric circles of duties first to oneself, then to
one's friends and family, then to fellow citizens, and then to all other
human beings.1 08 Iwao Taka has written of similar notions in Japanese
ethics.109
While a great deal of ink could be spilled analyzing these notions,
it is important to recognize that human beings intuitively tend to
think, for the most part, that our duties to our families, for instance,
supersede our duties to our fellow citizens. Given the previously
noted findings of anthropologists and psychologists, this should not
surprise us. While the approach of Business as Mediating Institution
should not give a license to ignore any responsibility to those outside
of the firm, a corporation is more likely to find that moral behavior
can be accomplished by considering the needs of internal
constituents.
3. Justification Through Management Theory
The understandable fear of any broadening of corporate duties is
that doing so undermines the role corporations play in society which
is to efficiently produce goods and services for consumers. Raising
the notion of duties to any stakeholder can trigger a reaction like
those seen in Part II.
There is a significant stream of managerial theory, however, indi-
cating that a mediating institutions approach is efficacious. Total
Quality Management (TQM) is based on carefully understanding and
106 See, e.g., Solomon, supra note 73.
107 See generally Timothy L. Fort, Goldilocks and Business Ethics: A Paradigm that Fits
'just Right", 23J. CORP. L. (forthcoming Jan. 1998).
108 SeeJEFFREY WATTLES, THE GOLDEN RuLE (1996).
109 Iwao Taka, Business Ethics: A Japanese V'rew, 4 Bus. ETHIcs Q. 53 (1994).
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meeting the needs of customers." 0 But in the midst of the sophisti-
cated statistical processes necessary to assure that products and serv-
ices will be free of defects,"' an important notion of TQM is to
recognize that a co-worker is a customer whose needs must be met." 2
When the workplace becomes one in which there is a shared concern
for individual fulfillment and empowerment, which is what mediating
institutions do,1 1S it produces pride, meaningful work, and a reduc-
tion of sloppiness. This is why W. Edwards Deming wrote:
He [the worker] will feel important to thejob if he can take pride in
his work and may have a part in the improvement of the system.
Absenteeism and mobility of the work force are largely the result of
poor supervision and poor management .... The possibility of
pride or workmanship means more to the production worker than
gymnasiums, tennis courts, and recreation areas.1 14
Other popular, contemporary theories such as "Open-Book Man-
agement"" 5 offer similar notions, but the theme of empowered work-
ers championed by Business as Mediating Institution is not the same
as a full-fledged workplace democracy. Gary Hamel and C.IL
Prahalad, probably the most influential management strategists today,
argue that while "bureaucracy can strangle initiative and progress, so
too can a large number of empowered but unaligned individuals who
are working at cross-purposes."' " 6 Instead, they argue that employees
also want a sense of direction set by management, a notion of what
they call "strategic intent."" 7 So too, Business as Mediating Institu-
tion does not call for worker plebiscites in order to operate a com-
pany. It does, however, call for corporations to recognize that they
are communities and that in communities interpersonal relationships
are important. Because they are important, so are ethical duties, be-
cause relationships are sustained by ethical rules and principles. Cre-
ating such organizations, however, is not only possible, but has already
110 See MARY WALTON, Tm DEMING MANAGEMENT METHOD (1986).
111 See JOHN S. OAKLAND, TOTAL QUALITY MANAGEMENT (1989), for a good exam-
ple of the individual steps and statistical processes necessary to establish a TQM
system.
112 See id. at 29-42, 145.
113 See PETER BERGER & RICHARD JOHN NEUHAUS, To EMPOWER PEOPLE: THE ROLE
OF MEDIATING STRUCTURES IN PUBLIC PoucY 7 (1977).
114 DEMING, supra note 68, at 83-85.
115 SeeJOHN CASE, OPEN-BooK MANAGEMENT: THE COMING BUSINESS REVOLUTION
(1995).
116 GARY HAMEL & C.K. PRAHALAD, COMPETrING FOR THE FUTURE 290 (1994).
117 Id. at 129.
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been done. Business as Mediating Institution is a way to build on
those successes on a wider scale.
C. A Proposal for Implementation
In many ways, the notion that we should place less weight on im-
portant ethical issues such as the environment or the relationship be-
tween a host community's well-being and the corporation seems
troublesome. I do not wish to deny that such responsibilities are im-
portant, nor to suggest that they not be addressed. It also can be ar-
gued that by focusing our duties on what our nature predisposes us
toward (internal members) I fall prey to the so-called "naturalistic fal-
lacy" because I confuse "what is" with "what ought to be." Moreover, if
all human beings are important, why draw the line at internal mem-
bers? To take a biblical example, do we not risk being on the wrong
side of the story of the Good Samaritan?
To briefly and preemptively respond to such possible criticisms, it
is important to note that the mediating institutions position does not
claim to offer a complete solution to ethical dilemmas in business.
The mediating approach is essentially a theory of the firm proposing a
new model of corporate governance. Even in this regard, such a the-
ory has many additional questions to answer, but for the purpose of
normative thought, the approach does not argue that businesses
should not be "Good Samaritans," but that we will never learn to be
"Good Samaritans" until we learn that we are responsible for others.
Learning that lesson is hard to do if one has not been socialized to see
it. This is exactly what mediating institutions do.
Relatedly, noting that we may be naturally adapted (or designed)
to look first to members of our communities is not to confuse "what
is" and "what ought to be," but to note that we will never understand
"what ought to be" if we demand duties beyond our ability to absorb.
Simply making corporations into mediating institutions would dra-
matically change the way they operate. It might be worth working out
the kinds of mediating approaches before trying the more complex
work of full-blown stakeholder theory.
A mediating institutions approach requires that individuals have
the opportunity to participate in the decisions affecting their lives.
This is a central theme of stakeholder theory as well. In practice, it is'
impossible in all but the smallest of organizations for individual em-
ployees and shareholders to have such a role, which is why agency
theory is a necessary theoretical component of stakeholder manage-
ment. But a mediating institutions approach suggests two levels of
participatory control in corporate decisions.
[VOL. 73:1200
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First, there ought to be employee representation on the board of
directors in some form. I leave open the question of what the best
form would be. It could follow a German model of employee repre-
sentation on a board overseeing the work of a board of directors or it
could follow the lines of an employee-owned company in which em-
ployees have direct representation on the board itself."I 8 The point is
that there ought to be a voice of internal, nonshareholder stakehold-
ers on the board.
Second, employees ought to have the ability to be a part of the
processes of the work in which they are engaged. It is through this
kind of work that identity is formed and individuals learn that they are
members of a community with both rights and responsibilities. Con-
temporary management models, such as TQM, provide a ready store-
house of the economic efficacy of such an approach. Thus, even if
employees do not control the firm, they ought to be able to have a say
in how work they do is performed.
The first recommendation is statutory. The second is not. Both
are necessary, but it is hard to see how a statute could be drafted so as
to require specific levels of participation in the work employees do.
While I would certainly be open to suggestions of how that might be
done, it does not seem to me that law can successfully mandate the
second approach. It becomes one of managerial and moral
integration.
IV. CONCLUSION
Corporations that are structured as mediating institutions owe
primary duties to internal constituents. Those include shareholders
and employees. Because of the difficulties in articulating a voice
other than that on the board, it is important for employees to have
some kind of representation on the board itself. Moreover, if a corpo-
ration is a community-that is, a mediating institution in which indi-
viduals learn both rights and responsibilities-particular work must be
structured so as to provide some type of effective meaning." 9 While
board representation may be statutory, work details are not
118 See Edward B. Rock, America's ShiftingFascination with Comparative Corporate Gov-
ernance, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 367 (1996), for a good review of German and other compar-
ative corporate governance models.
119 See Timothy L. Fort, The Spirituality of Solidarity and Total Quality Management
14 Bus. & PROF. ETmCSJ. 12 (1995), in which I argue that TQM's efficacy is based on
an affective connection between the person and her work that is similar to the solidar-
ity that is prominent in Roman Catholic Social Thought.
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The rationale for this approach is that it takes advantage of the
valuable aspects of stakeholder theory, manifested legal by corporate
constituency statutes, as well as other business ethics theories. It does
not, however, ask of corporations more than they are capable of do-
ing. By proposing a "mediating" position between full-blown stake-
holder theory and traditional shareholder responsibility, corporations
may be able to be more like communities in which moral identity as
well as economic efficiency is fostered.
I do not wish to suggest that this theory is complete. There are
many other questions that require attention. For instance, one impor-
tant question is determining exactly who is an internal constituent. Is
a part-time employee an internal constituent or is that person more in
the realm of an independent contractor?
A second question is what other elements are necessary for an
organization to be one in which individuals find meaning and iden-
tity. In addition to the psychological issues inherent in this question,
there is also a role for issues such as dispute resolution. Do mediating
institutions need mediation structures within them to be a community
that resolves its own disputes?
A third question, or set of questions, concerns corporate govern-
ance. One encounters a host of questions as to what this model would
mean in terms of election of directors and their responsibilities,
mechanisms for complaints, and liability issues.
A fourth question extends the second one by asking how self-
standing institutions avoid tribalism.1 20 While mediating structures
provide identity, they also have a darker side. How does one provide
for some kind of a "corporate federalism" so as to allow "moral free
space" to corporations that do not violate basic standards of conduct.;
This is a question that has a significant opportunity for integration
with Donaldson and Dunfee's work, particularly on hypernorms. 121
What about the sources relied upon in this article? While I would
contend there is great promise in seriously incorporating naturalist
findings into moral theory, there is danger in confusing "what is" with
"what ought to be." Thus, there is justificatory work to be done in
120 See, e.g., W. Jethro Brown, The Personality of the Corporation and the State, 21 LAW
Q. REV. 365, 368 (1905). Brown wrote that people act differently in groups than they
do individually so that "[u] nder the inspiration of espirit de corps, the humane will give
a cruel decision, the cruel a humane." This is a potential problem requiring serious
attention.
121 Although I have not seen formal work making the connection between tradi-
tional theories of natural law and hypernorms in business ethics, this strikes me as a
worthy integration to make.
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order to more fully ground the legitimacy of this source as it relates to
ethical and legal conduct of business.
Extending this idea further, how does a mediating institutions
paradigm help us in global business? It may well be that it does not
help us at all in questions such as environment because the corporate
focus is primarily internal (although internal members may well have
an interest in the environment that they can voice with board repre-
sentation). If mediating institutions do not help with this, it suggests
that they are helpful in business ethics in some ways, but that they
must be supplemented in other ways as well. My hunch is that they
require supplementation-I do not think that Business as Mediating
Institution is a "silver bullet." I do conclude, however, that structuring
corporations as mediating institutions provides a mechanism for insti-
tutionalizing ethical behavior in business in a way that has pragmatic
and moral desirability.
IN MEMORIAM
JOHN J. BRODERICK
The Broderick legend is made of stern stuff. His dramatic, ebullient
personality is fed by deep springs. He lives an intense spiritual life.
With what Aquinas called magnanimity, he manages to make it seem
easy to give abundantly.*
* From a faculty resolution upon Professor Broderick's retirement, 50 NoTRE
DAME LAw. 569 (1975).
